action, the most aggressive tests find their genesis in Warren Court opinions, particularly in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority 13 and Reitman v. Mulkey. 4 Finally, the resurrection of meaningful substantive due process review was the handiwork of the Warren Court. Without Griswold v. Connecticut, ' 5 it is less certain that we would have Roe v. Wade. 6 The Supreme Court's return to substantive review of state and federal legislation for consistency with unenumerated, yet fundamental, rights runs back to Griswold (as does the rehabilitation of Lochner" era cases such as Meyer v. Nebraska" 5 
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters 9 ). .A Brief Review of the Warren Court's Approach to Enforcing Constitutional Rights: The Unfortunate Disjunction ofMeans and Ends
The most notable characteristic of the Warren Court in the field of enforcing constitutional rights was its creativity in reaching results favorable to those asserting rights against the government and the consistency with which it exhibited this creativity. Most of the time, I find myself very sympathetic to the outcomes in the Warren Court's major civil rights and civil liberties decisions. ' However, that said, I harbor some serious reservations about the longterm effects of the methodology often employed by the Warren Court in reaching these desirable results. 2 ' A careful scholar of the Constitution and constitutional jurisprudence should have serious misgivings about the Warren Court's willingness to accept and embrace its role as a political institution by reaching results that created new law without much of an effort to ground the result in the text or history of the Constitution or to relate the result back to prior judicial precedents. 22 More often than not, if the end was sufficiently 13 . 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 14. 387 U.S. 369 (1967 important, the means used to get there did not terribly concern the Warren Court. Arguably, this ends-justify-the-means approach overshadowed -and ultimately betrayed -the Warren Court's institutional obligations to act as a legal and judicial institution. 23 Yet, serious methodological misgivings notwithstanding, one should neither overlook nor underestimate the Warren Court's unwavering commitment to transforming merely theoretical (and largely empty) constitutional promises into meaningful (and judicially enforceable) rights. The outcomes in cases such as Brown v. Board of Education 24 and Gideon v. Wainwright 2 5 were far from preordained. A Court composed of members with less vision, less compassion, or less courage easily could have decided these cases quite differently. Moreover, Chief Justice Warren's personal stewardship of the project of expanding the scope and meaning of civil rights and liberties was simply remarkable. Earl Warren was indeed the "Super Chief."1 26 Nevertheless, one cannot look back without experiencing a certain sense of disappointment at the means sometimes used to accomplish laudable ends. Chief Justice Warren and his Court often placed results above processa decision that might have seemed necessary (if not prudent) at the time, but in the hindsight of history, a decision that has proven quite detrimental to the long-term impact of the Warren Court's precedents. It would be something of an understatement to suggest that scholars have not particularly celebrated the Warren Court for its judicial craftsmanship. 27 When reading some of the Warren Court opinions, one wonders precisely why a particular result flows, inexorably, from the Constitution.
as just another job on the national political scene.").
23. See id. at 759 ("To conservatives, the Warren Court converted constitutional law into ordinary politics.").
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954 After all, Congress considered itself the principal protector of the newly emancipated freedmen's civil and political rights. Moreover, its members expressly reserved to themselves the power to enforce the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 33 From the perspective of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal government was the answer to the pervasive problem of racial discrimination by the state governments, not part of the problem. Accordingly, Congress might have written the Fourteenth Amendment to preclude states from using racial classifications while reserving for itself an ability to write laws that expressly use race as a basis for granting or withholding government benefits. The Freedmen's Bureau, with its promise of "Forty Acres and a Mule," represents a direct use of race to grant a benefit to one racial group (the newly freed African Americans) and yet to deny the same benefit to other citizens who lacked membership in the preferred racial group.
Thus, the question takes on subtleties that completely transcend the particular problem of school desegregation. One might well believe that the federal government should be able to establish race-based remedial programs that the state governments could not themselves establish. That is to say, the Equal Protection Clause might be thought to leave states without the power to use race-based classifications and yet to allow the federal government some latitude to do so.
Yet, the Warren Court's sloppy theory of reverse incorporation, convenient if not persuasive, left open the door to the identical application of the Equal Protection Clause to both the state and federal governments. With the advent of precedents disabling states and local governments from establishing "benign" race-based classifications," the Boiling holding made it very easy to extend this prohibition to the federal government itself. And, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 35 the Rehnquist Court made this exact jurisprudential move."' Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor explained that the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence reflects principles of "skepticism," "consistency," and "congruence."" By this, she meant that equal protection demands strict scrutiny of all race-based government classifications ("skepticism"), applies to minorities and non-minorities alike ("consistency"), and binds both the state and federal governments ("congruence"). 38 the equal protection guarantee has grown to encompass protection against invidious discrimination based on gender, 4 " nationality, 4 9 disability,"° and apparently sexual orientation."' Perhaps most importantly, the modem doctrine of substantive due process, which safeguards "fundamental liberties" from abridgment absent a compelling state interest, relates directly back to Griswold v. Connecticut 2 and Loving v. Virginia. 3 Modem constitutional law, at least in the area of civil rights and civil liberties, constitutes a running commentary on the ideas and theories of the Warren Court. Although not all Warren Court precedents have survived the test of time, the Warren Court fundamentally reoriented the agenda of the federal judiciary. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a contemporary debate about civil rights and civil liberties that does not draw upon the jurisprudential legacy of the Warren Court.
Consider, for example, the state action doctrine. As most lawyers, scholars, and judges know, harms from nonstate actors," a private entity may lawfully engage in behavior in which the government itself may not. Thus, prior to the enactment of major new civil rights legislation in the 1960s, the presence or absence of state action typically prefigured whether a defendant had an obligation to refrain from racial discrimination. 6 Because of the importance of state action to the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Warren Court began expanding the scope of the doctrine to reach more ostensibly "private" conduct. Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority" arguably represents the zenith of this jurisprudential effort. In Burton, the Justices articulated the "symbiotic relationship" test, under which a federal court should hold an ostensibly private entity accountable under the Fourteenth Amendment if it seems reasonable to do so in light of the overall facts and circumstances. The Court characterized this test in terms of a mutually beneficial relationship between a private entity and the state." 8 However, the test really represented an open-ended inquiry into the relationship between the state and the private entity in order to ascertain whether it would be fundamentally fair to hold the private entity accountable for constitutional violations. In conjunction with the symbiotic relationship test, the nexus test casts a very broad net indeed. State action doctrine is a complex field, and reasonable people hold differing views as to what level of connection between the state and a private entity justifies imposing constitutional obligations on an ostensibly private entity. That said, the Warren Court's efforts made it very difficult for government to avoid responsibility for racial discrimination by delegating responsibility for the discriminatory actions to a private-sector entity. In this way, the expanded scope of state action doctrine greatly facilitated the Warren Court's equality project.
During the Burger Court and continuing into the Rehnquist Court, the Justices have limited the scope of the Warren Court's state action precedents. In a series of cases beginning inthe mid-1970s and continuing into the 1980s, the Supreme Court restricted the scope of the state action doctrine considerably. 62 In case after case, the Justices declined to find state action present. 63 Although never flatly overruled, the Warren Court precedents appeared to hold significantly diminished binding power.
But sometimes the Warren Court's vision has an inescapable appeal. The Warren Court's commitment to holding government responsible for constitutional wrongs arguably represents one of those moments of moral clarity that also yields a compelling legal principle. Although the Warren Court's broad vision of state action fell into a state of desuetude under the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, it has proven to be more robust than some critics might have anticipated.
In 69 The Supreme Court also had held that the government did not cease to be the government through the use of a corporate shell to advance a public policy. 7 " The federal courts consistently applied these tests independently and in isolation; factors relevant to one test were not germane to the application of a different test. 71 Brentwood Academy represents a marked departure from this methodology and reorients modem state action analysis toward its Warren Court roots.
Justice Souter did not apply the state action tests in isolation to find that the Association was a state actor. Instead, he examined the Association's function, its membership, and its relationship to the State of Tennessee (particularly to the Tennessee State Board of Education). 72 Justice Souter noted: "The entwinement down from the State Board is... unmistakable, just as the entwinement up from the member public schools is overwhelming." 73 The Brentwood Academy Court expressly recognized its departure from prior state action precedents: Entwinement is. . .the answer to the Association's several arguments offered to persuade us that the facts would not support a finding of state action under various criteria applied in other cases. These arguments are beside the point, simply because the facts justify a conclusion of state action under the criterion of entwinement, a conclusion in no sense unsettled merely because other criteria of state action may not be satisfied by the same facts. 4 This exposition represents a new and different state action test, an amalgam of bits and pieces of evidence relevant to pre-existing state action tests but perhaps insufficient to satisfy any one of those tests standing alone. That the Association was not a state actor under these other state action tests was irrelevant to the Court because "[e]ntwinement will support a conclusion that an ostensibly private organization ought to be charged with a public character and judged by constitutional standards; entwinement to the degree shown here requires it."" The majority's novel approach brought howls of protest from three dissenting Justices, led by Justice Thomas. He opened his dissent with the trenchant observation that "[w]e have never found state action based upon mere 'entwinement.'"" Justice Thomas's statement was entirely accurate: the entwinement test represented something new under the sun. Previously, state action analysis required a plaintiff either to establish that the entity was the government itself or to satisfy the exclusive-government-function test, symbiotic-relationship test, or nexus test," Moreover, it is highly doubtful that the Association fully satisfied any of the pre-existing state action tests." 8 The majority acknowledged that the pre-existing state action tests might not have justified its conclusion, but argued that this lack of justification simply did not matter. "Facts that address any of these criteria [the other state action tests] are significant, but no one criterion must necessarily be applied." 79 Thus, entwinement constitutes an independent test for the presence of state action. "When, therefore, the relevant facts show pervasive entwinement to the point of largely overlapping identity, the implication of state action is not affected by pointing out that the facts might not loom large under a different test." ' dealing with libel and privacy, are for the most part an undistinguished lot of surprisingly trivial cases clothed in ill-fitting but by now wholly conventionalseeming First Amendment garb." 6 In Professor BeVier's view, the Warren Court's efforts to protect civil rights through an expansive reading of the Free Speech Clause have devolved into a "hodge-podge of supposedly constitutionally mandated adjustments to the common law of libel." 8 Professor BeVier convincingly offers a cautionary note about the perils of unintended consequences. 8 Moreover, the Warren Court appeared especially prone to overlook this sort of problem in its decisions."
With free speech now being used by citizens affirmatively opposed to pluralism and multiculturalism, doctrines fashioned to facilitate the end of de jure segregation are now deployed to protect the Ku Klux Klan and the American Nazi party and to attack efforts to create more inclusive communities through speech regulations such as campus speech codes. As Professor BeVier notes, "It's a fair bet that the Warren Court never imagined that civil liberties and civil rights could ever be on a collision course." 9 Undoubtedly the Warren Court could better have advanced its vision of the law had it thought more comprehensively about the potential implications of both its holdings and the reasons offered in support of them.
Professor Calmore presents a more sympathetic review of the Warren Court's handiwork, at least insofar as its decisions helped to reframe and recast the nation's thinking about issues of race. Rather than focusing on discrete results and rationale in particular cases, Professor Calmore sees the Warren Court's significance primarily in cultural terms. "I think that the real value of the Warren Court's race jurisprudence lies in its force as a cultureshifting tool and, more importantly, in its inspiration to advocates of social justice." 9 '
Indeed, for Calmore the language of law is itself inadequate to the task of reforming contemporary culture. He posits cultural studies as an Although Calmore asks rhetorically, "Did the Warren Court promise too much or not enough?," 9' his arguments for the co-equal status of cultural norms to legal norms in the equality project plainly moot the question. Because the Warren Court limited its discourse to the formal language of law, it could never have achieved the revolution in race relations that Calmore believes to be an essential precondition to true equality. Of course, the Warren Court's precedents were themselves constitutive of the community's zeitgeist and affected the framing of race in contemporary American society. From this point of view, it is reasonable to ask whether the Warren Court did everything that it could to advance the equality project. But, plainly, if culture has an inexorable pull on law and legal norms -as Calmore posits -the Warren Court, by itself, could never do enough to remake society in a truly egalitarian image.
Professor Calmore cogently argues that whatever shortcomings might have inhered in the Warren Court's decisions on race, the subsequent decisions of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts are far worse. In particular, he accuses the Burger Court of a kind of willful blindness to the pervasive relevance of race as a social phenomenon. 100 (1981) (holding that City of Memphis could erect traffic barriers that separated predominantly white neighborhood near public park from predominantly black neighborhood on other side of street on theory that aesthetics and concern for unwanted traffic provided race-neutral reasons for city's action).
American society through the aggressive enforcement of negative constitutional rights; yet, the kind of broad-based societal reform necessary to create true conditions of equality might require the recognition and enforcement of both negative and affirmative rights." a In Peller's view, the Warren Court was too timid in requiring affirmative state action to redress inequality: "Many of the celebrated Warren Court rulings in the areas of individual and civil rights applied a de jure analysis, and accordingly incorporated a conservative social theory, even as the rulings seemed to favor progressive political and cultural positions."' 1 4 These decisions undermined the Warren Court's ability to promote progressive social change because they limited government responsibility for structural impediments, such as poverty, to the exercise of constitutional rights and to meaningful participation in the project of democratic self-governance. These rulings, which "depended on the same libertarian image of a private realm free from public power that it had so thoroughly discredited in the social and economic area, 0 5 permitted the state to escape any responsibility for conditions of vast inequality throughout American society.
Looking to Warren Court decisions like Green v. County School Board of New Kent County'°6 and Sherbert v. Verner,'°7 Professor Peller argues that the Warren Court perceived the importance of providing affirma-tive relief, as opposed to merely prohibitory relief, for constitutional wrongs; the Court often required remedial steps in addition to the cessation of the unlawful discriminatory actions."°' As Judge Frank Johnson observed, "[Ihf we, as judges, have learned anything from Brown v. Board of Education and its progeny, it is that prohibitory relief alone affords but a hollow protection to the basic and fundamental rights of citizens to equal protection of the law."' Peller embraces this sort of reasoning and suggests that a focus on the de facto effects of both government action and government inaction would significantly improve the fundamental fairness of rights adjudication in constitutional law. l " 0 "The virtue of the defacto standard is that it permits a wider appraisal of the social order to determine if the social conditions for constitutional legitimacy actually exist .... [T]he defacto standard is linked to views of collective responsibility and to the norm of social solidarity. "I 1 The implications of Professor Peller's proposal are quite broad. As he himself notes, "[TIhe logical consequence of the victory of a general de facto standard of constitutional review would be to subject virtually all legislative action to judicial scrutiny -and the result is even more extreme than that."" ' A fully actualized defacto regime would empower the federal courts to act proactively to create the conditions necessary for democratic selfgovernance without "wait [ing] for legislative action at all -because governmental inaction itself might be the reason for the inability to exercise rights of free speech, or voting, or travel."" ' 3 Ultimately, "were the Court to apply widely the de facto standard, the judiciary would evaluate the entire social field to ensure its consistency with constitutional norms."" ' 4 Thus, Peller's critique of the Warren Court is that it was not progressive enough -that it recognized the limits of negative constitutional rights, worked around those limits in a handful of cases, but otherwise failed to reorient rights discourse in a way that would meaningfully empower economically disadvantaged persons.
Peller's critique provides an interesting contrast with the commonly held view that the Warren Court was, in fact, too activist. In essence, his claim seems to be that the Warren Court was not activist enough. This claim may well be true, and certainly vast disparities in wealth continue to exist in the contemporary United States. It also appears reasonably clear that economic need correlates with less active citizenship -particularly with respect to voting. 11 " However, as a matter of practical politics one has to wonder if the Warren Court could have successfully transformed the concept of rights in the fashion that Peller suggests. A similar attempt by the Lochner-era Court ultimately failed, and in the process the Supreme Court managed to discredit itself to the point of generating bizarre court-packing schemes." 6 Political realities might well have impeded the sort of jurisprudence that Peller advocates or, presumably worse yet from his perspective, succeeded in creating a discourse of positive rights, only to have that discourse reoriented from the poor and powerless to the propertied." 7 Ultimately, one can only speculate about what the Warren Court legacy might have become had the Court embraced the full implications of its recognition of positive rights in cases like Green and Sherbert. Professor Peller's Article posits the possibility of a constitutional jurisprudence more congenial to the progressive agenda. Perhaps this could have been so; perhaps not. In either case, it bears noting that at least some critics on the Left see the Warren Court's legacy as reflecting undue timidity, as opposed to unseemly haste, in the creation and enforcement of rights.
IV Conclusion
The Warren Court presided over arguably the most important period for the development of human rights in the United States. Indeed, the Warren Court's overall importance is second only to that of the Marshall Court, which established the strong system of judicial review that prevails today (to say nothing of its efforts to sustain a strong and effective national government). 11 The Articles that follow bear testament to the importance of this period in American constitutional law. That the authors have such divergent attitudes about the work product of the Warren Court and its continuing legacy reflects the gravity of the Warren Court's decisions and the innovative means that it used to reach them.
The echoes of the Warren Court continue to reverberate in contemporary constitutional law discourse. It has been thus for the past fifty years and will likely be so for the next fifty. Questions of equality and fundamental fairness -the central projects of the Warren Court -will remain salient so long as some citizens perceive a lack of equality or fairness in the status quo. And although we have come a long way since Brown v. Board of Education, we still have a great distance to travel before the words "Equal Justice for All" describe a universally lived reality rather than merely a grand and hopeful aspiration.
